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Article 
Wartime Judgments of Presidential 
Power: Striking Down but Not Back 
William G. Howell† 
When assessing presidential actions taken during war, Su-
preme Court Justices do not merely acknowledge the objective 
threat that the nation faces. They often argue, and almost al-
ways imply, that foreign threats sanction judicial deference to 
the President.  
Two tendencies exhibited by the Court support both asser-
tions. First, even when they overturn presidential wartime in-
itiatives, Justices make a point of conveying their appreciation 
for the material threat that the nation faces.1 Indeed, even 
landmark repudiations of presidential power during periods of 
war acknowledge the practical challenges presidents face in 
leading the nation to military victory.2 Second, when they over-
turn presidential wartime initiatives, Justices often intimate 
that the Court might have ruled differently if either the exigen-
cies of war were more immediate or the President’s initiative 
more integral to the war effort itself.3  
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Chicago, Harris School of Public 
Policy. Paper prepared for the Minnesota Law Review Symposium, “Law & 
Politics in the 21st Century,” University of Minnesota Law School, October 17, 
2008. I thank Rose Kelanic and Evan Coren for research assistance. Long con-
versations with Nancy Staudt laid the foundation for the core arguments here-
in. For financial support, the author thanks the Smith Richardson Foundation 
and the Program on Political Institutions at the University of Chicago. Copy-
right © 2009 by William G. Howell.  
 1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008) (“The real 
risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely to soon 
abate.”).  
 2. See, e.g., id. at 2276–77 (“[T]he President . . . begin[s] the day with 
briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our nation and its 
people. The law must accord the executive substantial authority to apprehend 
and detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 2277 (“If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose 
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As a prelude to a more comprehensive analysis of Supreme 
Court rulings on presidential power during times of peace and 
war,4 this Article employs a least likely research design and 
scrutinizes the opinions of three Supreme Court cases: Ex parte 
Milligan,5 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6 and Bou-
mediene v. Bush.7 These three cases, most would agree, consti-
tute the preeminent examples of judicial wartime rebukes of 
presidential power during each of the last three centuries. 
Hence, if the Justices in these cases acknowledge the excep-
tional nature of war and the importance of temporarily confer-
ring discretion upon the presidents who wage it, then they 
surely do so in the larger class of wartime challenges to presi-
dential power. Wherever the upper bound of judicial deference 
may lie, these three cases demonstrate that the lower bound 
nonetheless recognizes the relevance of war when adjudicating 
challenges to presidential power and the possibility of uphold-
ing at least some actions that, if evaluated during periods of 
peace, would not withstand judicial scrutiny. 
With hopes of avoiding distractions, five points warrant 
mention from the outset. First, the discussion that follows is 
meant to be strictly positive. I have no interest in engaging the 
rich, voluminous, debates about what Justices ought to do dur-
ing periods of crisis.8 These normative debates for much too 
long have lacked empirical grounding, as scholars advance doc-
trine without any systematic evidence about how judges actual-
ly behave during times of peace and war. This Article (and the 
larger project to which it alludes) clarifies how wars actually 
impact judicial decision making on issues of presidential power. 
More specifically, it investigates how Supreme Court Justices, 
 
dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this lux-
ury.”).  
 4. WILLIAM HOWELL, IN TIMES OF WAR: PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE 
MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY (forthcoming).  
 5. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 6. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 7. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 8. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 101–22 (2006); Oren Gross, Chaos and 
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 
YALE L.J. 1011, 1096–134 (2003); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Origi-
nalism and Emergencies: A Reply to Lawson, 87 B.U. L. REV. 313–21 (2007); 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein 
and Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959, 973–70 (2004); Christina E. Wells, Questioning 
Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 935–49 (2004).  
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in their own opinions, talk about war when reflecting upon ei-
ther the constitutionality or statutory authority of presidential 
actions taken during war. It has nothing to say about whether 
these rulings, or the jurisprudence that supports them, are 
good or bad. 
Second, as much as is possible, the analysis herein focuses 
squarely on wartime judicial rulings on presidential power, and 
not on the larger class of civil liberties and rights which have 
received ample attention elsewhere.9  
Third, this Article makes no pretense of having revealed a 
formal doctrine or principle that wars automatically trigger. 
The proposition that judges evaluate presidents by different 
standards during times of peace and war has always been con-
tested.10 The observations below, therefore, speak to what 
might more appropriately be called a norm of judicial decision 
making. Indeed, while wars may influence a Justice’s assess-
ment of presidential power,11 the onset of war does not auto-
matically trigger a new set of rules or procedures that explicitly 
bind the Justice to one course of action or another.  
Fourth, this Article examines how the Justices’ opinions re-
flect upon their thinking about the relevance of war. Its pur-
pose decidedly is not to use these opinions to establish either 
the precedential value of a case, or the general importance of a 
case in the pantheon of judicial rulings. Consequentially, in ad-
dition to the majority opinions, I also cull the entirety of con-
curring and dissenting opinions (very much including dicta) for 
references to the incidence of war and its relevance for judicial 
decision making.12 
 
 9. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME (2004); GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY (2007); David Cole, 
Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times 
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme 
Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1 (2005); Arthur H. Garrison, The Judiciary in Times of National Security Cri-
sis and Terrorism: Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipsos 
Custodes?, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Defending Ko-
rematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273. 
 10. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, What is War? Reflec-
tions on Free Speech in “Wartime,” 36 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 833 (discussing 
whether different standards of judicial review are appropriate during war-
time).  
 11. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008).  
 12. Admittedly, when examining dissenting opinions, the assertion that 
these cases constitute a “least likely” research agenda begins to break down. 
Though the majority opinions constitute setbacks for presidents during times 
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Finally, the fact that this small sample of wartime opinions 
so prominently and pervasively features practical considera-
tions about war does not prove that wars caused the Justices to 
rule as they did. Even the most careful reading of the three 
cases, after all, does not substitute for a systematic evaluation 
of the universe of war- and peace-time challenges to presiden-
tial power.13 Additionally, it is quite possible that Justices rea-
son backwards from positions they take on purely ideological 
grounds.14 During war, unelected Justices also may feel com-
pelled to signal to the President, Congress, and the public that 
they understand the security threat facing the nation, and that 
they appreciate the sacrifices of those individuals who are try-
ing to address it. The cases, nonetheless, present a hard test for 
the more modest proposition that Supreme Court Justices give 
credence to norms that, depending upon one’s formulation, rec-
ommend varying amounts of heightened judicial deference dur-
ing times of war.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I very briefly summa-
rizes the relevant literature on presidential power, war, and 
what scholars have intermittently called “crisis jurispru-
dence,”15 the “constitutional law of war,”16 “executive expedien-
cy discourse,”17 the “doctrine of constitutional relativity,”18 and 
 
of war, there is no reason to believe that the dissenting opinions examined be-
low represent a hard case for the proposition that Justices are more prone to 
defer to the President during peace than during war. 
 13. This Article, nonetheless, may help inform the kind of quantitative 
study that would provide a basis upon which to draw causal inferences. The 
Justices in these three cases offer no indication that they hold presidents to 
higher standards during periods of war than during times of peace, suggesting 
that war can only aid a President’s chances in court. See infra Part II. Addi-
tionally, the probability that the courts would uphold wartime actions taken 
by presidents is likely to increase when the nation faces larger, more immi-
nent security threats, and when Justices are asked to evaluate presidential 
actions that are integral to the military campaign. And the age, popularity, 
and perceived success of a war may also bear upon the Court’s willingness to 
overturn assertions of presidential authority. By analyzing a much larger 
sample of war- and peace-time challenges to presidential power, each of these 
empirical claims can readily be tested. 
 14. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Dissents Against Type, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1535, 1536–37 (2009) (arguing that Justices generally vote in criminal cases 
based on their preferred policy outcomes).  
 15. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 1.  
 16. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1947). 
 17. Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and 
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671, 674 (1998).  
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the “judicial deference thesis.”19 Part II, which constitutes the 
core of this essay, culls three landmark rulings against execu-
tive power for indications of how wars (if at all) influenced the 
Justices’ decisions. Part III then summarizes the lessons from 
these cases and offers some modest assessments about judicial 
checks on presidential power. 
I.  THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN WARTIME   
Wars do not merely disrupt systems of governance. Wars 
remake governments. They thrust politicians into new debates 
about policy issues, they reshape the relationships between in-
dividuals and states, and they redefine the very purposes of 
government.20 And wars have the potential to do more still. 
They can reallocate power among the various branches of gov-
ernment. And almost always, scholars and statesmen have ar-
gued since at least the nation’s founding, wars do so in ways 
that benefit the President.21 
A.  FOUNDING CONCERNS ABOUT WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER 
The Founders worried a great deal about the possibility 
that foreign wars might stimulate presidential action and exalt 
the office of the presidency. Indeed, it was for precisely this 
reason that the Constitution vests so much war-making author-
ity in Congress, which was thought to slow the pace of war, ra-
ther than the President, who was feared to use the military for 
his own private purposes and who, through war, might find the 
means by which to consolidate his control over the machinery of 
government.22 
In Federalist Number 8, Alexander Hamilton recognized 
that “[i]t is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the 
expense of the legislative authority.”23 Echoing these senti-
 
 18. See LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER 288 
(1951).  
 19. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 313.  
 20. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 57–77 (1987); David R. Mayhew, Wars 
and American Politics, in 3 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 473, 473–93 (2005).  
 21. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLI-
TICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 105 (2003). 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961).  
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ments, Madison argued in Helvidius 4 that “[w]ar is in fact the 
true nurse of executive aggrandizement.”24 After all, Madison 
continued, “[i]n war the honors and emoluments of office are to 
be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which 
they are to be enjoyed.”25 Hamilton and Madison, of course, 
disagreed vehemently about the merits of a powerful presiden-
cy. But on their particular assessment of war’s contribution to 
presidential power, the two adversaries stood together. If any 
branch of government benefits from war, it is the executive. 
On the issue of ratification, the Anti-Federalists broke with 
both Hamilton and Madison, insisting that the Constitution’s 
safeguards of individual liberty were wholly insufficient.26 But 
at a deeper level, they too shared Hamilton and Madison’s as-
sessments of war and presidential power.27 The Anti-Federalist 
Papers bristle with condemnation against an “elective king” 
whose war powers permit, and even encourage, the concentra-
tion of virtually all government authority.28 Writing under the 
pseudonym Cato, George Clinton recognized the President as 
“the generalissimo of the nation . . . [who] of course, has the 
command and controul [sic] of the army, navy and militia; he is 
the general conservator of the peace of the union . . . .”29 By tak-
ing the nation to war, Clinton insisted, the President would 
brandish powers that no government of a free people should re-
tain.30 Clinton recognized that wars do not merely augment the 
power of the federal government generally; they fundamentally 
alter the President’s power vis-à-vis Congress and the courts.31 
Through war, Clinton and his fellow Anti-Federalists charged, 
a fledgling democracy would revert to the very monarchical sys-
tem over which a revolution was waged.32 
 
 24. JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER IV (1793), reprinted in THE PA-
CIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING 87 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007). 
 25. Id.  
 26. TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING 
37 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995). 
 27. See generally GARY L. GREGG, THINKING ABOUT THE PRESIDENCY: 
DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 7 (2005). 
 28. See generally 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing 
ed., 1981). 
 29. CATO, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1787), reprinted 
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 28, at 116. 
 30. GREGG, supra note 27, at 7.  
 31. Id. at 6.  
 32. Id.  
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The Founders’ concerns have persisted for over two centu-
ries. They reappeared a generation later in Joseph Story’s 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.33 They 
constituted a central preoccupation in the Civil War writings of 
William Whiting, who sought to both understand and defend 
Lincoln’s wartime rule.34 Writing in the wake of the Second 
World War and Franklin Roosevelt’s reign in office, presidency 
scholars such as Edward Corwin and Clinton Rossiter argued 
that presidents exert a degree of influence over foreign and 
domestic policy during times of war that is unimaginable dur-
ing times of peace; and, not coincidentally, that the courts have 
done very little to check this expansion.35 More recently, histo-
rians such as Arthur Schlesinger and Stephen Graubard have 
suggested that wars, throughout the nation’s history, have fun-
damentally altered the executive machinery of government.36 
And contemporary deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
sparked renewed discussions of an “imperial presidency, redux” 
and its implications for our system of governance.37 In 1956, 
Rossiter nicely summarized conventional wisdom on the topic: 
it has become an “axiom of political science,” he noted, that 
“great emergencies in the life of a constitutional state bring an 
 
 33. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 546–80 (photo. reprint 1987) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & 
Co. 1833).  
 34. WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 17–61 (10th ed. 1971).  
 35. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1948, 
at 275–318 (3d ed. 1948); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 82–
111 (1956).  
 36. STEPHEN GRAUBARD, COMMAND OF OFFICE: HOW WAR, SECRECY AND 
DECEPTION TRANSFORMED THE PRESIDENCY FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO 
GEORGE W. BUSH 3–32 (2004); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRES-
IDENCY 35–68 (1973).  
 37. See Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency Redux, WASH. POST, 
June 28, 2003, at A25; see also MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED 178–215 (2007); PETER 
IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE CONSTI-
TUTION 120–32 (2005); JAMES P. PFIFFNER, POWER PLAY: THE BUSH PRESI-
DENCY AND THE CONSTITUTION 84–194 (2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: 
THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 10–37 (2007); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, WAR AND THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 45–69 (2004); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ & AZIZ Z. 
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF 
TERROR 153–200 (2007).  
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increase in executive power and prestige, always at least tem-
porarily, more often than not permanently.”38 
If Rossiter’s observation warrants the status of social 
scientific axiom—and there are reasons to believe otherwise39—
one naturally wonders exactly how it came to be such. From 
where does this wartime expansion of presidential power origi-
nate? Contenders certainly include the voting habits of a defe-
rential Congress, the willingness of leaders of both parties to 
affirm executive authority, and the propensity of an impres-
sionable public to rally behind its President. But Rossiter’s 
axiom also may implicate the courts. Scholars have long sug-
gested, and many have explicitly recommended, that judges 
and Justices who evaluate directives issued by presidents open-
ly reflect upon the incidence of war, and in so doing, they often 
grant the President greater discretion to pursue policy ends 
during periods of war than during times of peace.40  
B.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN 
WAR 
When trying to advance a domestic or foreign policy agen-
da during times of war, what powers can presidents draw from 
the Constitution? Very few, at least explicitly. In its design of 
the office of the presidency, the Constitution is quite precise 
about some matters. It specifies exactly how the President and 
Vice-President will be elected,41 who can run for office,42 and 
who can vote,43 the precise day on which a newly elected Presi-
dent will take office,44 and the terms by which the President’s 
salary can be adjusted.45 None of these matters, though, ad-
dress the actual powers that presidents can exercise once in of-
fice. Compared to the clear litany of responsibilities granted to 
 
 38. ROSSITER, supra note 35, at 64–65.  
 39. William Howell & Tana Johnson, War’s Contributions to Presidential 
Power, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE U.S. PRESIDENCY (forthcoming by 
George Edwards & William Howell eds., 2009).  
 40. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 141 (discussing the role of 
the presidential power during the Korean War).  
 41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 42. Id.  
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
HOWELL_4fmt 4/18/2009 4:56 PM 
1786 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1778 
 
 
Congress,46 the constitutional bases for presidential power, 
whether during war or peace, are deeply ambiguous.  
Consider, for instance, how the Constitution distributes 
authority over the waging of war. On the one hand, the Consti-
tution gives Congress the power to: “declare War, grant Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures 
on Land and Water;”47 “raise and support Armies;”48 “provide 
and maintain a Navy;”49 “make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces;”50 “provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress In-
surrections and repel Invasions;”51 and “provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the Militia.”52 The President, by con-
trast, is: “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual Service of the United States;”53 and may 
“appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers.”54 Account-
ing for either the number or specificity of war powers granted, 
a plain reading of the Constitution hardly affords the President 
a deep reservoir of authority on matters involving war. 
For purposes of assessing presidential power in wartime, 
though, the key question has less to do with the prosecution of 
a war, and more to do with the President’s ability to develop 
and implement his domestic and foreign policy agenda while it 
is waged. Here again, though, a superficial reading of the Con-
stitution hardly supports the contention that presidents have 
at their disposal vast powers to govern the country during pe-
riods of war. The Constitution, after all, says precious little 
about what presidents can do when the life of the nation is im-
periled. Nowhere, for instance, does the Constitution recognize 
anything akin to Locke’s prerogative powers, with which presi-
dents can act without statutory authorization, and in some cas-
 
 46. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing numerous powers conferred on 
Congress).  
 47. Id. cl. 11. 
 48. Id. cl. 12.  
 49. Id. cl. 13. 
 50. Id. cl. 14.  
 51. Id. cl. 15.  
 52. Id. cl. 16.  
 53. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 54. Id. cl. 2.  
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es against it, in order to preserve a larger public good.55 Accord-
ing to Jeffrey Tulis, the Founders “did not choose to make pro-
visions for the institutional encouragement of demagoguery in 
time of crisis, refusing to adopt . . . the Roman model of consti-
tutional dictatorship for emergencies.”56 To the contrary, notes 
Gary Lawson, “[t]he Constitution deals with extraordinary 
times primarily through ordinary powers.”57 Indeed, the only 
explicit mention that constitutional protections might be lifted 
during crises concerns the suspension of habeas corpus “when 
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require 
it.”58 This provision, though, is found in Article I, not Article 
II—and hence grants wartime power to Congress rather than 
the President.  
On what basis, then, might one find a constitutional ratio-
nale for presidents exercising expansive powers during war? 
Three sources stand out: the designation of commander in 
chief, the executive power, and the Take-Care Clause. Plainly, 
a veritable army of scholars has debated the bold (some would 
say tyrannical) actions that presidents have taken in the name 
of any one or combination of these constitutional provisions.59 
 
 55. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 237 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).  
 56. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 30 (1988).  
 57. Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common 
Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2007). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
 59. Compare HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117–33 (1990) (discussing 
the Iran-contra affair, and noting that the “pervasive national perception” that 
the President must act swiftly and secretly to respond to fast-moving interna-
tional events “has almost inevitably forced the executive branch into a contin-
uing pattern of evasion of congressional restraint”), and JOHN P. MACKENZIE, 
ABSOLUTE POWER: HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY IS UNDERMINING 
THE CONSTITUTION 55–63 (2008) (critiquing the unitary executive theory, say-
ing it has “no basis in history or coherent thought,” but noting “it could be 
called the legal philosophy of President George W. Bush,” and urging that it 
“needs to be understood and resisted with a firmer grasp of the nation’s forma-
tive ideals”), and David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, 
in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19–
56 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“The unmistakable trend 
toward executive domination of U.S. foreign affairs in the past sixty years 
represents a dramatic departure from the basic scheme of the Constitution.”), 
with JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 143–82 (2005) (contending, based on the Con-
stitution’s text, structure, and history, that the President has flexible war-
making and foreign affairs powers), and Lawson, supra note 57, at 303–10 
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As previously indicated, this Article neither joins nor referees 
this normative debate. Rather, it makes a more basic claim: 
that presidents, justified or not, exploit constitutional ambigui-
ty to their own advantage, in the short term to advance particu-
lar policy initiatives, and in the longer term to consolidate their 
power more generally. In ambiguous constitutional provisions, 
presidents have found a basis upon which to exalt their position 
within our system of separated powers, and to claim authority 
that nowhere appears, at least explicitly, in Article II. And par-
ticularly during times of war, the Constitution’s inherent ambi-
guity “provide[s] the opportunity for the exercise of a residuum 
of unenumerated power.”60  
Consider, for starters, the title of commander in chief, 
which confers upon the President primary responsibility for 
waging war. Advocates of a strong President, and presidents 
themselves, have long argued that this title places presidents 
at the very center of war.61 Where this constitutional obligation 
abuts other statutory or constitutional limitations, say these 
same advocates, the former should predominate.62 After all, 
Chief Justice Hughes famously argued, the power to wage war 
is “a power to wage war successfully.”63 These same scholars 
note that the successful prosecution of any war sometimes re-
quires presidents to act outside the strict boundaries of statuto-
ry or constitutional authority.64 Having recognized that 
“[p]eacetime procedures do not necessarily fit wartime needs,”65 
advocates of a vigorous wartime presidency argue, we must 
employ different standards for evaluating the conduct of presi-
dents during periods of peace and war.66  
Advocates of a “unitary” presidency similarly offer a more 
expansive reading of Article II’s Vesting Clause during periods 
 
(“[M]ore exercises of [the ‘executive Power’] will be constitutionally permissible 
during crises than during normal times . . . .”).  
 60. RICHARD PIOUS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 38 (1979); see also Terry 
M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A 
Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUDS. Q. 854–56 (1999). 
 61. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 141 (discussing the term 
“commander-in-chief” in relation to President Franklin D. Roosevelt).  
 62. Id. at 68–99.  
 63. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934). 
 64. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 143–44 (discussing the con-
stitutionality of the President’s actions during the Korean War).  
 65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 106 (1943) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 66. Id.  
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of war. These scholars make much of the fact that the Constitu-
tion gives the President, and the President alone, the “execu-
tive Power.”67 The President therefore deserves wide latitude to 
oversee personnel and policy within the executive branch. 
When evaluating whether specific actions taken by presidents 
conform to their executive power, some say, we must invariably 
make decisions about the “reasonableness” of his actions—that 
is, we must determine whether a president’s actions are “pro-
portionate to the end, efficacious, and respectful of background 
constraints based in rights and structure.”68 Where presidential 
actions fail to meet “standards of reasonableness,”69 the courts 
and Congress have an obligation to overturn them. But the 
standards of reasonableness themselves, common sense dic-
tates, must vary according to the context in which the actions 
occur. Certain actions that are reasonable during war assured-
ly are not during peace. Hence, the executive power that the 
Constitution confers upon the President necessarily, and quite 
naturally, expands and contracts as the nation moves into and 
out of war.  
Presidents, too, must “take Care that the Laws be faithful-
ly executed,”70 which establishes the third, and arguably most 
defensible, constitutional basis for relaxing peace-time checks 
on a wartime presidency. Strictly speaking, the Take-Care 
Clause does not distinguish between periods of war and peace. 
Because laws enacted by Congress do, though, the clause none-
theless bestows upon presidents unique opportunities to exer-
cise power during periods of war. Congress has enacted literally 
hundreds of laws that grant presidents emergency powers that 
are triggered whenever the nation goes to war71—powers that 
 
 67. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EX-
ECUTIVE 55 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally 
Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696,  (2009).  
 68. Lawson, supra note 57, at 306. This originalist understanding of the 
Vesting Clause, of course, is highly contested—so much so, in fact, that Posner 
and Vermeule, whose work is the focus of Lawson’s article, openly reject it. See 
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 313. Calebresi and Yoo, meanwhile, ar-
gue that the powers afforded to the unitary executive are not conditional upon 
the existence of a state of emergency; quite the contrary, they argue that pres-
idents should retain total control over the executive branch during times of 
both peace and war. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 67, at 18–21.  
 69. For further discussion of the standards of reasonableness, see GARY 
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 52–56 (2004). 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 71. For an overview of laws that grant the President emergency powers 
and their invocation, see HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NA-
HOWELL_4fmt 4/18/2009 4:56 PM 
1790 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1778 
 
 
allow presidents to “seize property, organize and control the 
means of production, seize commodities, assign military forces 
abroad, institute martial law, seize and control all transporta-
tion and communication, regulate the operation of private en-
terprise, restrict travel, and, in a variety of ways, control the 
lives of United States citizens.”72 Indeed, so many emergency 
powers sit on the books that in 1976 Congress felt compelled to 
enact the National Emergencies Act, which sought to clarify the 
precise conditions under which presidents could invoke emer-
gency powers and the procedures for doing so.73 
Thus reading expansive powers into vague constitutional 
provisions, advocates of a powerful presidency establish the ba-
sis for a “crisis jurisprudence” that is meant to govern how 
judges and Justices evaluate presidential actions taken during 
times of war. The next sub-section summarizes key claims of 
crisis jurisprudence. The remainder of this Article then ex-
amines whether the Supreme Court, when overturning specific 
wartime actions taken by presidents, draws larger lessons 
about the exercise of presidential power during times of war—
that is, whether they explicitly reject the tenets of crisis juri-
sprudence, and thereby strike back when they strike down. 
C.  CRISIS JURISPRUDENCE  
An extraordinary body of work on crisis jurisprudence, one 
that can only briefly be summarized here, offers a blueprint for 
judicial deference during periods of war.74 Though most of the 
scholarship focuses on government abridgements of individual 
rights during times of war, a good deal of it implicates the Pres-
ident. To be sure, scholars have offered a wide range of reasons 
why judges and Justices employ crisis jurisprudence.75 Its core 
 
TIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 16–19 (2007), available at http:/www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/98-505.pdf. 
 72. Id. at 4. 
 73. Id. at 12; see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 74. For useful recent summaries, see sources cited supra note 9.  
 75. Explanations for the persistence of crisis jurisprudence vary widely, 
with different scholars emphasizing different determinants. Some focus on 
judicial concerns that the President might be especially prone to ignoring ob-
jectionable court rulings during times of war. See, e.g., HOWELL, supra note 21, 
at 136–75; SMITH, supra note 18, at 261–87; PHILIPPA STRUM, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND “POLITICAL QUESTIONS” 130–40 (1974). Another scholar emphasiz-
es the tendency of judges, like some elected officials, to exaggerate the threat 
faced by the nation. Wells, supra note 8, at 922. Still others highlight the in-
formational and tactical advantages of the executive and legislative branches 
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thesis, though, can be stated quite simply: when the life of the 
nation is in danger, the courts (some say appropriately, others 
not) grant presidents the widest possible latitude to prosecute 
wars; and consequentially, at least some presidential actions—
both international and domestic—that do not survive judicial 
scrutiny during times of peace do so, as a matter of course, dur-
ing periods of war. 
Crisis jurisprudence constitutes a direct repudiation of the 
notion, periodically expressed by the Justices themselves, that 
the government cannot change “a constitution, or declare it 
changed, simply because it appears ill adapted to a new state of 
things.”76  
Quite the opposite, crisis jurisprudence insists that the 
Constitution, if it is to survive, must adapt and evolve.77 The 
material context in which presidents operate crucially shapes 
the judiciary’s assessment of the constitutionality of their ac-
tions. And as contexts go, wars legitimate presidential action 
like no other. As Justice Felix Frankfurter argued so forcefully, 
“the validity of action under the war power must be judged 
wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigma-
tized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be 
lawless.”78  
The precise bounds of the argument, of course, remain vi-
gorously disputed. Most concede that crisis jurisprudence does 
not imply the utter dissolution of constitutional checks on pres-
idential power during times of war.79 Wars do not permit the 
 
in meeting foreign crises. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 313–21. 
Others highlight the tendency of judges to rally behind their President. See 
Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitu-
tional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 687–95 (1997). Finally, going one step further, Melvin Urofsky notes Jus-
tices’ proclivity to participate in the war efforts themselves. See Melvin I. 
Urofsky, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Extrajudicial Activity, Patriotism, and the 
Rule of Law, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW 26–36 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew 
eds., 2002).  
 76. People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 127 (1865).  
 77. See Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 4–6 (explaining why the Supreme 
Court alters its constitutional analysis under conditions of national threat). 
 78. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 79. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War 1 (2003) (un-
published manuscript, on file with New York University), available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/nbeck/q2/king.propensity.pdf (finding that when 
the country is at war, the probability that the Supreme Court upholds a civil 
rights or liberties claim drops by only fifteen percent). 
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transformation of presidents into dictators. But they do permit 
a reasonably large number of actions that, during times of 
peace, would not pass constitutional muster. Consider the long 
list of allowances endorsed by Justice George Sutherland: 
To the end that war may not result in defeat, freedom of speech may, 
by act of Congress, be curtailed or denied so that the morale of the 
people and the spirit of the army may not be broken by seditious ut-
terances; freedom of the press curtailed to preserve our military plans 
and movements from the knowledge of the enemy; deserters and spies 
put to death without indictment or trial by jury; ships and supplies 
requisitioned; property of alien enemies, theretofore under the protec-
tion of the Constitution, seized without due process of law in the ordi-
nary sense of that term; prices of food and other necessities of life 
fixed or regulated; railways taken over and operated by the govern-
ment; and other drastic powers, wholly inadmissible in time of peace, 
exercised to meet the emergencies of war.80 
Presidents may not achieve everything they want during 
times of war. But if Sutherland’s sentiments are shared by oth-
er Justices, presidents ought to achieve a significantly higher 
proportion of policy victories during war than they do during 
peace. Consequentially, as Edward Corwin puts it: 
War does not of itself render constitutional limitations liable to out-
right suspension by either Congress or President, but does frequently 
make them considerably less stiff—the war emergency infiltrates 
them and renders them pliable. Earlier constitutional absolutism is 
replaced by constitutional relativity: it all depends . . . [on] what the 
Supreme Court finds to be reasonable in the circumstances.81 
Crisis jurisprudence thereby puts Justices into the busi-
ness of assessing the size and imminence of foreign threats, 
and of gauging the extent to which presidential policies effec-
tively address them. As Justice Black argued in the majority 
opinion to Korematsu v. United States, the much-maligned de-
cision that upheld President Roosevelt’s executive order placing 
Japanese Americans in internment camps, “[w]hen, under con-
ditions of modern warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile 
forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the 
threatened danger.”82 Consequentially, crisis jurisprudence 
demands greater deference for larger wars and dictates that 
judges look more favorably upon presidential policies that are 
more closely linked to the war efforts themselves.83 Assuredly, 
 
 80. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931). 
 81. CORWIN, supra note 16, at 80.  
 82. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220. 
 83. See Garrison, supra note 9, at 166 (“This view of judicial decision-
making assumes that, when called upon to curtail executive and legislative 
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presidents cannot free themselves from constitutional or statu-
tory shackles by sending a handful of troops abroad. Nor can 
presidents, when waging larger wars, claim extra-
constitutional powers to reshape policies that have nothing to 
do with the military campaign itself. But when exerting power 
that is commensurate with an external threat, and when ad-
vancing policies that qualitatively improve the nation’s chances 
of prevailing over that threat, presidents can proceed with 
some confidence that the judiciary will not stand in their way.  
Nevertheless, crisis jurisprudence remains a prescriptive 
theory of judicial behavior, and it is not a formal rule or doc-
trine that Justices must follow. When arguing their case before 
the Supreme Court, counsel for the President regularly plead 
with the Justices to grant due deference to the President dur-
ing periods of war.84 The Justices, though, are entirely free to 
disregard such pleas, to forswear crisis jurisprudence, and to 
evaluate presidential wartime initiatives exactly as if they had 
been issued during peace. Whether crisis jurisprudence has in-
fluenced the content of court rulings is therefore entirely an 
empirical question. 
D.  EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR CRISIS JURISPRUDENCE 
Much of the literature on crisis jurisprudence assumes that 
judges defer to the President during periods of war,85 and then 
sets about trying to identify why this is so. From this scholar-
ship, though, it is difficult to know just how pervasive—some 
would say insidious—crisis jurisprudence actually is. We simp-
ly lack the evidence required to evaluate when judges behave in 
ways that are consistent with the predictions of crisis jurispru-
dence and when instead they forsake the exigencies of war and 
check the exercise of presidential power. Three studies come 
close, but none offers a definitive answer. 
 
infringement of civil liberties during times of war and national crisis, the 
courts will fail to do so and take a very deferential and muted posture toward 
the actions of the other political branches.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 92 (1866) (recounting 
government counsel’s argument that the Court should defer to the will of the 
commander in chief when it comes to decisions made in times of war). 
 85. But see Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 28–29. These counterclaims, 
however, are in the minority. As Epstein and her colleagues recognize, “the 
crisis thesis is sufficiently convincing to the vast majority of members of the 
legal community that one version or another has made its way into judicial 
opinions and off-the-bench writing of Court members.” Id. at 36.  
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Methodologically, Lee Epstein and her colleagues have 
written the best quantitative study on crisis jurisprudence.86 
Surveying the universe of Supreme Court cases involving civil 
liberties during the latter half of the twentieth century, Epstein 
and her co-authors find substantial evidence that the courts do 
in fact take a narrower view of individual rights during periods 
of war.87 Interestingly though, they find that the courts are 
more likely to overturn policies that directly involve a war ef-
fort and that infringe upon individual rights.88 Unfortunately, 
these findings speak only tangentially to issues involving pres-
idential power. Many of the cases in their data set concern 
challenges to laws enacted by Congress, rather than policies di-
rectly advanced by presidents. Moreover, it is difficult to know 
whether a particular ruling supports Congress, the President, 
both, or neither. And the preponderance of presidential actions 
that come before the Court are not analyzed at all. 
The next two studies focus more intently on the presidency. 
The political scientist Tom Clark examined appellate court rul-
ings on non-criminal cases over a one-hundred-year-period, but 
found no evidence of heightened judicial deference to the execu-
tive during periods of war.89 In fact, Clark’s findings suggest 
that appellate judges are significantly more likely to rule 
against the President during wartime.90 He concludes that 
“constitutional checks and balances placed on executive power 
do not necessarily collapse during wartime.”91  
Finally, in earlier research, I investigated every executive 
order that was challenged on constitutional or statutory 
grounds in a federal court between 1942 and 1998.92 I found 
that courts affirm executive orders eighty-three percent of the 
time, and so doing, they occasionally provide justification for 
further expansions of presidential power.93 I unearthed no evi-
 
 86. Id. at 6–10 (introducing the different components of their methodolo-
gy).  
 87. Id. at 109 (“We show that war causes the Court to decide cases unre-
lated to the war in a markedly more conservative direction than they other-
wise would.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Tom S. Clark, Judicial Decision Making During Wartime, 3 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 397–419 (2006).  
 90. Id. at 416. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See HOWELL, supra note 21, at 151–74.  
 93. Id. at 154–55. 
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dence, however, that either the frequency of court challenges or 
the propensity of judges to side with the President systemati-
cally varies according to whether the country is at war.94 
Whatever their merits, these latter two studies hardly form 
the last word on the judiciary’s treatment of the presidency 
during periods of war. And they certainly do not disprove 
claims about the pervasiveness of crisis jurisprudence. It is 
quite possible that judges hear very different types of cases 
during times of war than during times of peace, even if the size 
of their caseloads remains roughly constant. On especially 
high-profile cases, judges may delay rendering a decision until 
after a military conflict has subsided; and Supreme Court Jus-
tices, of course, may refuse to grant certiorari in cases that 
would certainly command their attention during periods of 
peace. Neither study, moreover, examines the universe of Su-
preme Court challenges to presidential power over an extended 
time period. Recognizing the limitations of the existing quan-
titative work on the topic, Clark cautions that “much further 
analysis [is required] before a broad claim may be staked about 
the nature of non-criminal adjudication during wartime.”95  
II.  THREE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER   
The federal judiciary has not been shy about overturning 
policies backed by wartime presidents. Since 1933, in fact, the 
Supreme Court has ruled against the government in thirty-
nine percent of the 691 wartime cases to which the U.S. gov-
ernment was a direct party; and the Supreme Court ruled 
against the government in roughly thirty percent of those war-
time cases that were argued by the Solicitor General, whose 
presence may reveal aspects of the President’s views about a 
case’s importance.96 For the government generally, and the 
President in particular, war-time losses in the courts are not a 
rare occurrence. For the scholarly interest that they have at-
tracted though, three judicial challenges to presidential war 
powers stand above all others. This section carefully reviews 
 
 94. Id. at 166–67 (illustrating how individual judges vote on challenges to 
presidential actions pertaining to war). 
 95. See Clark, supra note 89, at 416.  
 96. To verify the percentages used in this data set, see The Judicial Re-
search Initiative, Research Databases and Data Archives, http://www.cas.sc 
.edu/poli/juri/databases.htm; see also WILLIAM HOWELL, IN TIMES OF WAR: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY (forthcoming). 
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each for what they say about the judiciary’s understanding of 
the relationship between war and presidential power. 
A.  EX PARTE MILLIGAN  
Controversy in Ex parte Milligan centered on the fate of 
Lamdin P. Milligan, who at the Civil War’s height in 1864 had 
been arrested at his home in Indiana and charged with con-
spiracy against the Government of the United States, inciting 
insurrection, giving aid and comfort to the Southern enemy, 
and violating the laws of war.97 According to the U.S. military 
Commandant of the District of Indiana, Milligan had been par-
ticipating in a plot to liberate Confederate prisoners of war and, 
eventually, to overthrow the state governments of Indiana, 
Ohio, and Michigan.98 For these crimes, Milligan was tried in a 
system of military commissions that President Abraham Lin-
coln had unilaterally created in 1862.99 Unlike civilian courts, 
military commissions denied defendants the opportunity to be 
present during the proceedings and to receive a jury trial.100 
The military commission found Milligan guilty and sentenced 
him to death.101  
Fortuitously for Milligan, the Civil War ended just before 
his scheduled hanging on May 19, 1865.102 The exigencies of 
war having subsided, Milligan’s lawyers promptly appealed his 
sentence.103 The circuit court’s two-judge panel, however, could 
not come to any resolution over the essential issues of the case, 
namely: whether an 1863 congressional statute gave the Presi-
dent the necessary authority to suspend the writ of habeas cor-
pus and try citizens in military commissions rather than civi-
lian courts;104 whether a civilian court had jurisdiction to hear 
 
 97. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866). 
 98. Id. at 6–7.  
 99. Id. at 6. 
 100. Id. at 29–30. 
 101. Id. at 7. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 7–8. 
 104. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceed-
ings in Certain Cases, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). According to the President, 
this Act effectively codified the President’s unilateral creations of military 
commissions in 1861. Counsel for Milligan, however, argued that Congress did 
not contemplate, and hence did not authorize, the trial of U.S. citizens outside 
of civilian courts. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 30–32.  
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an appeal from a military commission;105 and whether a civi-
lian court could discharge a defendant from custody.106  
In 1866, the case came before the Supreme Court, which 
sided with Milligan.107 According to the Court, neither the 1863 
statute nor local conditions in Indiana justified the imposition 
of martial law or the creation of military tribunals.108 The 
Court further ruled that as a United States citizen with no mil-
itary experience who inhabited a Northern state quite distant 
from the war’s primary hostilities, Milligan retained the right 
to be tried in a civilian court.109 The Court then found the subs-
tantive allegations against Milligan sufficiently weak as to 
warrant his immediate release from custody.110  
At the time, much of the press and public viewed the 
Court’s ruling as a setback for Republican members of Con-
gress who, over the continued resistance of President Andrew 
Johnson, sought to reconstruct the South.111 In particular, pro-
Republican newspapers condemned the decision as “judicial ty-
ranny,” “the most dangerous opinion ever pronounced by that 
tribunal,” and a “sorry attempt of five not so very distinguished 
persons to exhibit themselves as profound jurists, whereas they 
have only succeeded in proving themselves to be very poor poli-
ticians.”112 The New York Herald called the Court “a relic of the 
past, nine old superior pettifoggers, old marplots, a formidable 
barrier to the consummation of the great revolution.”113 The 
Cleveland Herald compared the ruling to the Dred Scott deci-
sion;114 the Chicago Tribune claimed that the decision would do 
little to improve the unfavorable impression of the Court;115 
and the Washington Chronicle openly accused the Justices of 
treason.116 The New York Times lamented that instead of sup-
porting “the common sense doctrine that the Constitution pro-
 
 105. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 9–11. 
 106. Id. at 31–32. 
 107. Id. at 134–42. 
 108. Id. at 134. 
 109. Id. at 134–35. 
 110. Id. at 135. 
 111. See, e.g., 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 211–12, 219 (1971); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 430–33 (2d ed. 1926).  
 112. See WARREN, supra note 111, at 430–31. 
 113. See id. at 432 n.1. 
 114. See id. at 432. 
 115. See FAIRMAN, supra note 111, at 218. 
 116. See WARREN, supra note 111, at 433. 
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vides for the permanence of the Union,” the Court “throws the 
great weight of its influence into the scale of those who assailed 
the Union and step after step impugned the constitutionality of 
nearly everything that was done to uphold it.”117  
Quickly, though, the case’s importance would transcend 
the political struggles occurring in the aftermath of the Civil 
War. For many, Milligan would emerge as a monument to judi-
cial checks on presidential war powers, and as a rejection of the 
notion that there exists, as John Quincy Adams argued in 1831, 
a “war power” that is “limited by regulation and restricted by 
provision in the Constitution” and a “peace power” that is “only 
limited by the usages of nations.”118 In the period between 
World Wars I and II, Charles Warren praised the decision as 
“one of the bulwarks of American liberty,”119 that “has since 
been recognized by all men as the palladium of the rights of the 
individual,”120 and that dealt “a staggering blow to the plans for 
the use of the military forces in the process of Reconstruction 
then being matured by Congress.”121 And at century’s end, 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist criticized the Court’s opinion 
for having introduced arguments that were not pertinent to the 
specific controversy at hand but also admitted that the decision 
“is justly celebrated for its rejection of the government’s posi-
tion that the Bill of Rights has no application in wartime.”122 
According to Oren Gross, Milligan is the paradigmatic ex-
ample of the “Business as Usual” model of judicial decision 
making.123 Indeed, for Gross, it is the only Supreme Court case 
to warrant an extended discussion of this model. In contrast to 
theories of “accommodation,” the Business-as-Usual model 
postulates that judges interpret the Constitution the same way 
 
 117. Id. at 429.  
 118. CORWIN, supra note 16, at 78. This notion also comports with Lin-
coln’s conception of presidential war powers. For longer discussions on Lin-
coln, see CORWIN, supra note 35, at 275–83. See also DANIEL FARBER, LIN-
COLN’S CONSTITUTION 115–43 (2003); CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 273–87 (1943). 
 119. WARREN, supra note 111, at 427. 
 120. Id. at 432. 
 121. Id. at 423.  
 122. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 137 (1998). 
 123. See Gross, supra note 8, at 1043; see also Jules Lobel, Emergency Pow-
er and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385–433 (1989); Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 8, at 15–18 (describing the “civil libertarian view” of 
wartime jurisprudence).  
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during periods of war and peace.124 Essentially prescriptive, the 
model dictates that:  
[A] state of emergency does not justify a deviation from the ‘normal’ 
legal system. No special ‘emergency’ powers are introduced either on 
an ad hoc or a permanent basis. The ordinary legal system already 
provides the necessary answers to any crisis without the legislative or 
executive assertion of new or additional government powers.125 
Lee Epstein and her colleagues go further still.126 The “Mil-
ligan thesis,” they contend, not only suggests that the courts 
guard basic civil liberties in times of both war and peace, but 
that the courts actually subject the government to greater scru-
tiny during periods of war.127 As Epstein et alia argue, Milligan 
stands for the fundamental proposition that “the justices must 
become especially vigilant in protecting rights and liberties 
during ‘commotions.’”128  
Each of these characterizations of Milligan has its share of 
supporting evidence. In their arguments before the Supreme 
Court, all three of Milligan’s attorneys insisted that his case 
had more to do with presidential war powers than it did with a 
single man’s fate.129 According to David Field, constitutional 
checks on presidential power “were made for a state of war as 
well as a state of peace.”130 James Garfield, who would assume 
the presidency fifteen years later, pleaded with the Court not to 
let the Constitution be “lost in war.”131 And if the British King 
lacked the power to “stretch the royal authority far enough to 
justify military trials,” as Attorney General Jeremiah Black ar-
gued, then surely the President could not read the Constitution 
 
 124. See Gross, supra note 8, at 1044 (“The Business as Usual model rejects 
the possibility that a tension exists between protecting the security of the na-
tion and maintaining its basic democratic values, including the rule of law.”). 
 125. Gross, supra note 8, at 1043.  
 126. See Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 6–8 (explaining the need for a more 
vigorous study of Supreme Court decisions during war and peace). 
 127. Id. at 3.  
 128. Id. (using the term “commotions” to describe “major international 
events, including war, that threaten the security of the nation”). 
 129. See BROOK THOMAS, CIVIC MYTHS 109 (2007) (“Milligan’s attorneys 
argued that their client had been denied rights by the Constitution and that 
those rights could not be suspended during wartime.”). 
 130. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MILLIGAN CASE (1867), reprinted in 1 
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY 
FIELD 38 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884). 
 131. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 47 (1866). 
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as granting the requisite authority to do so.132 After all, Black 
famously argued, the Constitution “does not carry the seeds of 
destruction in its own bosom.”133 
According to Milligan’s counsel, it was the province of the 
Court to ensure that presidential actions during times of war 
comply with the Constitution—which, they claimed, conferred 
on the President rather limited war powers in Article II. Con-
sistent with how Epstein et alia would later characterize Milli-
gan, Black noted that: 
[I]t is precisely in a time of war and civil commotion that we should 
double the guards upon the Constitution. In peaceable and quiet 
times, our legal rights are in little danger of being overborne; but 
when the wave of power lashes itself into violence and rage, and goes 
surging up against the barriers which were made to confine it, then 
we need the whole strength of an unbroken Constitution to save us 
from destruction.134 
When the nation stands on a war footing, Black argued, 
the courts must not cower before an energetic commander in 
chief. If the Court adjusts its behavior at all during times of 
war, it should do so by summoning altogether new courage to 
check the exercise of presidential power.  
For Justice David Davis, who would write the majority 
opinion in Milligan, such appeals seemed to resonate. Having 
deferred to the President repeatedly through the Civil War,135 
Davis seized Milligan as an opportunity to reclaim authority 
during peacetime that had been lost during the war. Though 
Milligan’s case was but one of many circulating through the 
federal judiciary, the Court saw fit to use it as an opportunity 
to vaunt the Constitution as working “equally in war and in 
peace,” protecting “all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances.”136 To argue otherwise, Davis seemed to say, 
was to accept the notion that the Constitution functioned much 
 
 132. JEREMIAH S. BLACK, ARGUMENT IN BEHALF OF LAMBDIN P. MILLIGAN, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1866), reprinted in 2 LEGAL 
MASTERPIECES 944 (Van Vechten Veeder ed., 1903). 
 133. THOMAS, supra note 129, at 109. 
 134. ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF JEREMIAH S. BLACK 525 (Chauncey F. 
Black ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1885). 
 135. In Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152–53 (1861), the Court did 
attempt to curtail the President’s ability to detain U.S. citizens. Lincoln, how-
ever, refused to comply with the judicial order, and in every subsequent case 
that challenged his prosecution of the war, the Court deferred to the executive 
branch. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 248 (1863); 
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 (1863).  
 136. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866).  
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like a gas lamp, to be turned on and off at a single man’s discre-
tion. But Davis and four of his colleagues expressly rejected 
such a notion:  
No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever in-
vented by the wit of man than that any of [the Constitution’s] provi-
sions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of govern-
ment. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the 
theory on which it is based is false; for the government, within the 
Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to 
preserve its existence.137 
At first glance, this seems like a sharp rejection of crisis ju-
risprudence. But a closer look reveals that the Court’s majority 
opinion in Milligan also is steeped in practical considerations 
about the President’s ability to lead the nation during times of 
war. The opinion hints that if the world looked different than it 
did in either 1866, when the Court rendered its opinion, or in 
1864, when Milligan was arrested and sentenced, then Milligan 
might well have swung from the gallows.138  
From the outset, the Justices suggested that their very wil-
lingness to take the case depended upon the war’s cessation. 
The opening lines of Justice Davis’s opinion admitted that “dur-
ing the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not 
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary 
to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question.”139 With the 
return of peace, though, “considerations of safety” need not be 
intermingled with “the exercise of power,” and at long last the 
Court could review a case without “the admixture of any ele-
ment not required to form a legal opinion.”140 The opinion that 
Davis would write, though, was not purely legal. With the na-
tion reunified, the Court continued to measure presidential 
power against the exigencies of war.  
In his argument on behalf of the federal government, Ben-
jamin Butler had emphasized the importance of accommodat-
ing a more expansive view of presidential power. He noted: 
In carrying on war, when in the judgment of him to whom the country 
has entrusted its welfare—whose single word, as commander of the 
army, can devote to death thousands of its bravest and best sons—we 
give to him, when necessity demands, the discretion to govern, out-
 
 137. Id. at 121.  
 138. Id. at 122 (explaining that had Milligan simply been tried according to 
the laws of Indiana, he still could have been found guilty and punished appro-
priately).  
 139. Id. at 109. 
 140. Id. 
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side of the ordinary forms and constitutional limits of law, the wicked 
and disloyal within the military lines.141 
Although the Court ultimately ruled against the govern-
ment, elements of Davis’s opinion gave credence to Butler’s 
claims. In particular, Davis implied that the Court would have 
ruled differently had Milligan been arrested and tried in Vir-
ginia rather than Indiana.142 This did not reflect concerns 
about the constitutionality of military commissions per se, but 
rather an assessment of whether or not local conditions permit-
ted the conduct of a fair and open trial in a civilian court. In 
Indiana, Davis noted, the civilian courts continued to operate; 
the state government allied itself with the North; and the thea-
ter of military operations remained distant.143 Had any of these 
facts differed, Davis might have recognized the need for martial 
law and the operation of military commissions and hence would 
have upheld Milligan’s death sentence.144  
Davis further weighed the material threat that Milligan 
posed to the cause of the North. The Justice made much of the 
facts that Milligan was a U.S. citizen; had lived in the Northern 
state of Indiana for 20 years; had never been convicted of a 
crime; and had never served in the military.145 Indeed, he re-
peated these facts several times in his opinion.146 One can in-
terpret these comments as indicative of the Court’s views on 
Milligan’s guilt or innocence. Or, alternatively, one can read 
these elements of the opinion as saying that threats to national 
security do justify extra-constitutional actions by presidents. 
The threats just need to be sufficiently grave for the Court to 
sanction such actions. 
 
 141. Id. at 92. 
 142. Id. at 127 (“Because, during the late Rebellion, it could have been en-
forced in Virginia, where the national authority was overturned and the courts 
driven out, it does not follow that it should obtain in Indiana, where that au-
thority was never disputed, and justice was always administered.”).  
 143. Id. at 126. 
 144. Davis noted:  
There are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in 
foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is 
impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on 
the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, 
there is necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus 
overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society. 
Id. at 127.  
 145. Id. at 7. 
 146. Davis begins his opinion by asserting these facts. See id. at 107–08. 
HOWELL_4fmt 4/18/2009 4:56 PM 
2009] WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1803 
 
 
In his dissent, meanwhile, Chief Justice Chase openly en-
dorsed the central tenets of crisis jurisprudence. According to 
Chase, the appropriate scope of governmental power—initiated 
by Congress, executed by the President—critically depended 
upon the circumstances in which the nation found itself. For 
Chief Justice Chase, war, above all other factors, augments 
state power:  
Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. . . . [But] when the 
nation is involved in war . . . it is within the power of Congress to de-
termine in what states or districts such great and imminent public 
danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for 
the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of 
the arm or against the public safety.147 
Chase openly rejected the idea that presidents, during 
times of war, could unilaterally create military tribunals.148 
But as long as Congress sanctioned his actions, the President 
could create alternative court systems that would survive judi-
cial scrutiny during periods of war, though perhaps not during 
times of peace. 
To be sure, Davis’s majority opinion contains strong lan-
guage, almost all of it dicta, indicating support for constitution-
al limits on presidential power and distrust of any president 
who would use war as a pretext for aggrandizing his own au-
thority. But the opinion also contains repeated references to a 
host of practical considerations about the President’s ability to 
prosecute war, and, by inference, the deference that the Court 
ought to grant him. Moreover, Chief Justice Chase, along with 
three other Justices, simply rejected the claim that the Consti-
tution is anything but a fluid document that affords greater 
powers to the government generally, and Congress and the 
President in particular, during times of war.149 When national 
security concerns are sufficiently acute, or when a perceived 
threat to a war’s prosecution is sufficiently great, the Court, in 
its discretion, may decide to grant the adjoining branches of 
government allowances that it would promptly retract during 
peaceful times. That it chose not to for Lamdin Milligan does 
not undermine the general proposition that wars can only aid, 
 
 147. Id. at 140. 
 148. Id. at 140–42 (arguing that only Congress has the authority to provide 
for the organization of a military commission). 
 149. Edward Corwin therefore summarized the lessons of the case this 
way: “the Bill of Rights could be suspended in wartime if, in the controlling 
judgment of Congress, the war effort and public safety required it.” CORWIN, 
supra note 16, at 80.  
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and can never hurt, presidents in their quest to expand their 
base of power. 
B.  YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. V. SAWYER  
After affirming some of the most extraordinary exercises of 
presidential power in World War II, the Supreme Court re-
buked the President right at the height of the Korean War. The 
occasion centered on a long-standing labor-management dis-
pute. When in April of 1952 the Federal Wage Stabilization 
Board failed to broker an agreement between the steel indus-
tries and their employees, the United Steel Workers of America 
announced its intention to launch a nationwide strike.150 In re-
sponse, President Truman issued executive order 10340, which 
directed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to immediate-
ly seize the steel mills and ensure their continued operation.151 
After initially complying with the executive order, the owners 
of the steel mills challenged its constitutionality in the federal 
courts.152  
Just one month after Truman issued his executive order, 
the Supreme Court heard arguments in the case.153 Lawyers for 
the steel mills argued that the President’s order amounted to 
an unconstitutional commandeering of private property and a 
usurpation of Congress’s legislative authority.154 Moreover, the 
President’s actions arguably violated the basic procedures for 
reconciling labor-management disputes in the 1947 Labor 
Management Relations Act, more popularly known as Taft-
Hartley.155 President Truman’s counsel responded that the or-
der, though not expressly authorized by statute or the Consti-
tution, was needed in order to avert a national catastrophe.156 
 
 150. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–83 
(1952). 
 151. Id. at 583. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Truman entered his order on April 9, 1952. Id. Responding promptly 
due to the importance of the issues raised, the Court heard arguments on the 
case starting May 12, 1952. Id. at 584. 
 154. See id. at 582 (“The mill owners argue that the President’s order 
amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has ex-
pressly confided to the Congress and not to the President.”). 
 155. See id. at 586 (“[T]he [labor-management dispute] plan that Congress 
adopted in [the Taft-Hartley] Act did not provide for seizure under any cir-
cumstances.”). 
 156. Id. at 582.  
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The government’s effort to wage war in Korea, after all, critical-
ly depended upon the uninterrupted production of steel.157  
In a 6-3 ruling, the Court found in favor of the mill own-
ers.158 Each of the Justices in the majority wrote a separate 
concurring opinion, a fact that suggests that each was moti-
vated by a slightly different set of considerations. For many, 
though, one central fact proved dispositive: when debating Taft-
Hartley, members of Congress had considered, and rejected, an 
amendment that would have granted the President the power 
to directly intervene in labor-management disputes when the 
nation was at war.159 Consequently, the will of Congress 
seemed to expressly prohibit the specific actions of President 
Truman. And as Justice Robert Jackson recognized in his now-
famous concurrence, presidential power reaches its nadir when 
in direct opposition to the wishes of Congress.160 
The media initially characterized Youngstown as a stun-
ning rebuke of Truman’s authority, and of the notion that pres-
idents during times of emergency possess powers not explicitly 
recognized in either the Constitution or in statute. A New York 
Times editorial described the decision as “a redefinition of the 
powers of the President” that “deliberately checked” the “trend 
towards indefinite expansion of the Chief Executive’s authori-
ty” and “minimize[d] the implied powers of the Presidency.”161 
Likewise, the Los Angeles Times editorial page characterized 
the decision as Truman’s “severest rebuff” from the Court, 
which found that “the President has no ‘inherent powers’ which 
enable him to make law to suit himself either in an emergency 
or at any other time.”162 
 
 157. See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952) (noting 
how “steel is an indispensable component of substantially all” weapons and 
materials used by the armed forces). 
 158. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (“[The] seizure order cannot stand.”). 
 159. See id. at 586 (discussing Congress’s refusal to adopt governmental 
seizure as a method of settling labor disputes). 
 160. See id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitution-
al powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”). 
 161. Steel: Theory and Practice, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1952, at 28; see also 
Arthur Krock, In the Nation: A Lesson for Critics of the American System, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 1952, at 30 (describing the significance of the decision consider-
ing “five of the six justices in the majority held against the leader of their par-
ty and the executive power from which they had received their appoint-
ments”). 
 162. Truman Gets His Severest Rebuff, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1952, at A4. 
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As in Milligan, elements of Youngstown reject the idea that 
presidents can freely claim powers during times of war that are 
unavailable to them during periods of peace. Justice Hugo 
Black, writing for the majority, suggested that Truman’s great-
est error consisted of usurping Congress’s lawmaking pow-
ers.163 The problem was not that private property was seized by 
the government; it was that the President, rather than Con-
gress, ordered the seizure. “In both good times and bad,” Black 
concluded, Congress alone retains the lawmaking power that is 
required to address the sorts of problems posed by the threat-
ened steel workers strike.164 No overriding public purpose, in-
cluding the successful prosecution of a foreign war, justified the 
president’s unilateral assumption of lawmaking authority.165 
Checks on the independent exercise of presidential power 
during times of war also appear in the concurring opinions in 
Youngstown. Justice William Douglas began his opinion thus: 
“There can be no doubt that the emergency which caused the 
President to seize these steel plants was one that bore heavily 
on the country. But the emergency did not create power; it 
merely marked an occasion when power should be exercised.”166 
Justice Jackson further worried that presidents might use wars 
as a pretext for asserting new controls over the conduct of do-
mestic affairs. No president, he argued, can justifiably “enlarge 
his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own 
commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign ven-
ture.”167  
While Justices in the majority challenged the President’s 
unilateral policymaking, dissenting Justices emphasized the 
importance of presidential leadership during periods of war. 
Indeed, the strong view that emergencies afford presidents ab-
solutely no additional power was in the distinct minority, as 
each of the concurring opinions offered exceptions to such a 
claim, and several (along with the three dissents) explicitly re-
jected it.168 While extolling a rather narrow interpretation of 
 
 163. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 588 (emphasizing that the “Constitution does not subject [the] 
lawmaking power of Congress to presidential . . . supervision or control,” even 
when “[t]he power of Congress to adopt such public policies . . . is beyond ques-
tion”). 
 166. Id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 167. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 168. See infra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. 
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the Constitution’s Commander-in-Chief Clause, Justice Jack-
son admitted that the Constitution itself might be unworkable 
if the Justices failed to “indulge some latitude of interpretation 
for changing times.”169 Justice Tom Clark openly endorsed the 
view that presidential power naturally, and unavoidably, ex-
pands during periods of crisis: “[T]he Constitution does grant to 
the President extensive authority in times of grave and impera-
tive national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant 
may well be necessary to the very existence of the Constitution 
itself.”170 
In fact, the Justices expressly held open the possibility that 
they would uphold some presidential actions during periods of 
war, even though these same actions would not withstand judi-
cial scrutiny during times of peace. While finding this particu-
lar executive order unconstitutional, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
refused to “define the President’s powers comprehensively.”171 
But at various points, the Justices in the majority nonetheless 
suggested that they might have ruled differently had Congress 
at least formally authorized the military action,172 or had the 
Korean War approached the size of either of the first two world 
wars.173 From the vantage point of the Justices in the majority, 
the Korean War simply did not amount to a sufficiently press-
ing national security threat to justify the President’s seizure of 
the steel mills.174 But by recognizing that “the President’s inde-
 
 169. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 170. Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).  
 171. Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 172. Id. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing the “powers that 
flow from declared war”).  
 173. Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring) (recognizing that the current sei-
zure did not result from “a military command addressed by the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently threatened 
with, total war”). Reflecting on this case nearly a half century later, Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist noted the significance of Truman’s decision to call the 
Korean War a “police action” rather than a war that required Congress’s for-
mal authorization. He then concluded that “I think that if the steel seizure 
had taken place during the Second World War, the government probably 
would have won the case under the constitutional grant of the war power to 
the president.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 191 (Alfred A. 
Knopf 2001) (1987); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the 
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (1993) (noting the “sweeping claim of 
presidential prerogative” that President Roosevelt enjoyed during World War 
II).  
 174. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring) (“The 
present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threat-
ened attack.”).  
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pendent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation 
confronting the nation,”175 the Court held open the possibility 
that at least some wars might permit, or even require, precisely 
the kinds of actions that Truman himself took in 1952.  
Within the context of the Korean War, one can well im-
agine still more changes to the case’s facts that might have eli-
cited a different ruling. One wonders, for instance, how the 
Justices might have ruled had: it been employees of a weapons 
manufacturer, rather than a steel industry, who threatened to 
strike; clearer evidence of a steel shortage existed; the threat-
ened strike came on more suddenly, and the prospective of a 
resolution appeared dimmer; or a more convincing case been 
made that success on the battlefield critically depended upon 
the continued operation of the mills. According to Maeva Mar-
cus, “the majority of the Court appeared unconvinced that the 
necessity for the seizure was as great as the administration 
claimed,” in part because the government was still allocating 
steel for recreational purposes and substantial inventories of 
steel were reportedly on hand.176 Indeed, according to some ob-
servers at the time, the country had enough steel for defense 
projects for at least thirty days after a strike, during which 
time labor and management might have settled their differenc-
es, and the steel mills might have reopened without the need 
for presidential intervention.177 Had steel supplies been scarc-
er, or had the strike been more disruptive, the Court might well 
have affirmed Truman’s order.178 
Shortly after the early and more sensationalist media re-
ports on the case, observers began to see that Youngstown 
 
 175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).  
 176. Maeva Marcus, Presidential Power in Times of Crisis: Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: 
CLASHES OVER POWER AND LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 65, 76 (Gregg 
Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004).  
 177. Steel: Hands Off, WASH. POST, June 11, 1952, at 14. 
 178. Interestingly, editorials in the New York Times abandoned their ini-
tial interpretation of the case as a broad repudiation of presidential wartime 
power, and instead began to publish a series of articles that suggested the Su-
preme Court left open the possibility that various mitigating circumstances 
might justify the President taking extraordinary measures in future crises. 
See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Editorial, Powers of a President After the Steel Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1952, at E3 (listing areas in the concurring opinions that 
left room for the President to act without specific statutory authority); Edi-
torial, Seizure Ends, But Strike Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1952, at E2 (de-
scribing how the Court’s decision does not necessarily “preclude extraordinary 
Presidential action in [future] times[s] of emergency”).  
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plainly did not cage the wartime President once and for all. Re-
flecting on the case in a June 5, 1952 essay, Walter Lippmann 
argued that the President unquestionably retained the authori-
ty to use emergency measures should a genuinely unantici-
pated national emergency arise.  
No one . . . has said or implied that the President cannot act to avert a 
national disaster unless there is express statutory authorization for 
the measures he believes he must take. If the disaster, which has to 
be dealt with, is of a kind which no one has foreseen, if therefore there 
is an absence of statutory law, there is no doubt at all that the Presi-
dent could act according to his best judgment . . . until Congress can 
convene and can legislate.179 
Stephen Galpin at the Wall Street Journal shared Lipp-
mann’s perspective, claiming that “[n]one of the nine justices 
contended that the President does not have some powers not 
expressly spelled out in the Constitution. To contend that 
would be to deny the President the power to act quickly and de-
cisively in a real emergency . . . such as an invasion.”180 
Youngstown constituted a genuine setback for Truman’s ef-
fort to wage an increasingly unpopular war in Korea. Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence established, arguably, the single most 
important framework for judges and Justices who would subse-
quently evaluate challenges to presidential power. The case, 
though, hardly amounts to a wholesale repudiation of crisis ju-
risprudence. In this instance, a rather stunning alignment of 
facts about the Korean War, the labor-management dispute, 
and the legislative history of Taft-Hartley worked against the 
President. But the Justices repeatedly suggested that under 
slightly different circumstances, they might have upheld the 
President’s wartime activities, knowing full well that they 
plainly would not during times of peace. 
C.  BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH  
Nearly 150 years after Milligan, the Supreme Court once 
again evaluated the use of wartime military tribunals to try in-
dividuals suspected of either plotting or engaging in violence 
against the U.S. government.181 This time, Lakhdar Boume-
diene stood at the center of the controversy. The federal gov-
 
 179. Walter Lippmann, Op-Ed., Today and Tomorrow: The Court and the 
Steel Case, WASH. POST, June 5, 1952, at 17.  
 180. Stephen K. Galpin, The President’s Powers: Impact of Court Ruling 
Goes Beyond Its Literal Words, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1952, at 4. 
 181. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2229 (2008). 
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ernment charged Boumediene, a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
with planning an attack on a U.S. Embassy in October of 
2001.182 At the time of the Supreme Court hearing, Boume-
diene was held at the U.S. Guantanamo Bay Detention Facili-
ty, which, according to the Bush administration, remained out-
side of the jurisdiction of U.S. civilian courts.183 Boumediene v. 
Bush raised questions about the legality of the detention of all 
suspects held at the Guantanamo Bay military base, as well as 
the constitutionality of the system of military tribunals de-
signed to try them.  
In June 2008, the Supreme Court once again repudiated 
presidential assertions of power.184 In the majority opinion, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy insisted that the Supreme Court 
could, in fact, consider habeas appeals by Guantanamo detai-
nees, even though Congress had stripped the U.S. civilian 
courts of jurisdiction over the trials of these non-U.S. citi-
zens.185 The Court further ruled that the operating system of 
military tribunals did not afford sufficient Due Process protec-
tions and, in the Court’s judgment, would render decisions that 
were prone to error.186 Boumediene thereby paved the way for 
Guantanamo prisoners to challenge their detainment in civilian 
courts, and set in flux a system of tribunals that had been years 
in the making.  
It is much too soon to evaluate Boumediene’s long-term 
significance. In the near term, the case appears to have upset 
the Bush administration’s anti-terrorism policies.187 As one de-
 
 182. Matteo M. Winkler, When ‘Extraordinary’ Means Illegal: International 
Law and European Reaction to the United States Rendition Program, 30 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33, 61 (2008). 
 183. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244 (“The Government contends that 
noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and detained in territory located 
outside our Nation’s borders have no constitutional rights and no privilege of 
habeas corpus.”). 
 184. Id. at 2275 (holding that the petitioners are entitled to seek the writ of 
habeas corpus, and striking down Military Commissions Act Section 7 as un-
constitutional).  
 185. Id. at 2277. The existing system of military tribunals did offer detai-
nees limited access to civilian courts. Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs), which operated in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, were 
charged with reviewing the status of individuals held at Guantanamo. Id. at 
2241 (“[T]he Deputy Secretary of Defense established [CSRTs] to determine 
whether individuals detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants’ . . . .”).  
 186. Id. at 2270. 
 187. See Stephen I. Vladeck, On Jurisdictional Elephants and Kangaroo 
Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 172, 172 (2008) (noting how the Court’s recent de-
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tainee’s defense lawyer put it, the ruling “appears to demolish 
this argument that the Constitution does not apply in Guanta-
namo Bay.”188 Georgetown Law Professor Neal Katyal called 
the decision “astounding.”189 Robert Barnes of the Washington 
Post characterized the ruling as “a historic rebuke to the Bush 
administration,”190 while Jonathan Mahler, a New York Times 
journalist, wrote, “it seems indisputable that the court is more 
powerful today than ever.”191 The Supreme Court decision dealt 
“perhaps the final blow” to the President’s detainee policy, ac-
cording to Boston Globe reporter Farah Stockman.192 “The 
court’s majority took aim at Bush’s long-held assertion that, as 
U.S. commander in chief during wartime, he has broad powers 
to detain terrorist suspects as he sees fit in order to protect the 
nation.”193 Legal experts agreed that Boumediene “left Bush 
with few options.”194  
As noted above, the Justices in previous decisions made 
much of the fact that the President lacked legislative authori-
zation for his wartime directive (Milligan), or that he acted 
contrary to the will of Congress (Youngstown). But in Boume-
diene, the President had plainly secured Congress’s authoriza-
tion to establish military tribunals, and the Court nonetheless 
ruled against his assertion of power.195 Indeed, the President 
sought this congressional authorization under the instruction 
of some of the Justices just two years earlier. In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,196 a precursor to Boumediene, members of the Court 
informed the President that the system of military tribunals he 
had unilaterally created would stand on firmer constitutional 
 
cision in Boumediene has the possibility to “lead to the frustration and/or inva-
lidation of existing [anti-terrorism] policies”). 
 188. William Glaberson, Lawyers for Detainees Plan to Use Justices’ Ruling 
to Mount New Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at A14. 
 189. Jonathan Mahler, Why This Court Keeps Rebuking This President, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at WK3. 
 190. Robert Barnes, Justices Say Detainees Can Seek Release, WASH. POST, 
June 13, 2008, at A1. 
 191. Mahler, supra note 189.  
 192. Farah Stockman, Justices Open US Court to Detainees: Deal Setback 
to Bush; Influx of Cases Expected, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2008, at A1. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242, 2274 (2008) (explain-
ing that although the MCA authorizes the creation of military tribunals, the 
Act unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus).  
 196. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
HOWELL_4fmt 4/18/2009 4:56 PM 
1812 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1778 
 
 
ground if he secured Congress’s formal authorization.197 At that 
time, the system of military tribunals operated under a 2001 
military order issued by the President.198 In 2006, therefore, 
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which 
authorized the system of military tribunals proposed by the 
President.199 In 2007, President Bush then issued executive or-
der 13425, which, under the unmistakable authority of MCA, 
superseded the original military order.200 Remarkably, though, 
the Court in Boumediene still saw fit to overturn a system of 
tribunals that both the President and Congress had a hand in 
creating.  
Dissenters in Boumediene charged the majority with a 
“bait and switch,”201 an accusation that conservative media and 
Republicans in Congress vaunted repeatedly in the days that 
followed the ruling.202 But these objections raise a more fun-
damental question: if the Court was going to provide enemy 
combatants with access to civilian courts, why did it not do so 
in Hamdan rather than Boumediene?203 The President’s system 
 
 197. For example, Justice Breyer stated in his concurrence: 
Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create 
military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the 
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he be-
lieves necessary. Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation 
with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not 
weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that 
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through 
democratic means—how best to do so. The Constitution places its 
faith in those democratic means. Our Court today simply does the 
same. 
Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). For more on this issue, see Michael P. Van 
Allstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 309–71 (2006) (analyzing the “claimed power of the president to create 
federal law on the foundation of the executive’s status as the constitutional 
representative of the United States in foreign affairs”).  
 198. Military Order No. 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 199. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 200. Exec. Order No. 13,425, 72 Fed. Reg. 7,737 (Feb. 14, 2007). 
 201. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 2229, 2285 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 202. See, e.g., Editorial, Combating the Combatants Decision, NAT’L REV., 
June 13, 2008, http://author.nationalreview.com/?q=MjE1MQ== (follow “Com-
bating the Combatants Decision – 06/13” hyperlink) (“There was still the fact 
that Congress—at the beckoning of the very Court—had provided the jihadists 
held at Gitmo with an unprecedented array of protections, including judicial 
review.”).  
 203. In Hamdan, the Court found that the then-operating military tribun-
HOWELL_4fmt 4/18/2009 4:56 PM 
2009] WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1813 
 
 
of military tribunals, after all, stood on significantly stronger 
ground in the latter case than in the former.204 Whereas Presi-
dent Bush was implementing a unilateral directive in the first 
case, he was faithfully executing a congressional statute in the 
latter.205 Moreover, the reconstituted military tribunals under 
the MCA prohibited the use of evidence obtained by torture or 
inhumane treatment,206 which, some argued, should have al-
layed concerns raised by the majority in Hamdan that the mili-
tary tribunals violated the Geneva Conventions.207 
One can only speculate about why the Court passed on the 
opportunity to substantively reject a unilaterally-created tri-
bunal system, only to do so two years later. Contributing fac-
tors, though, likely include the absence of any terrorist attack 
stateside,208 the growing public disaffection with the Iraq 
War,209 and the President’s poor standing with the American 
public.210 This was a President, after all, whose party lost both 
chambers of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections211 and who 
 
als lacked “power to proceed,” but it stopped short of insisting that enemy 
combatants have access to civilian courts. Instead of examining the President’s 
argument that it would be impracticable to apply the rule and principles of 
law that govern the trial of criminal cases in the United States districts courts’ 
to Hamdan’s commission, the Court called into question the President’s unwil-
lingness to apply the “rules for courts-martial.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 567, 623 (2006).  
 204. Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 948b (“The President is autho-
rized to establish military commissions under this chapter for offenses triable 
by military commission as provided in this chapter.”). 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. § 948r(b). 
 207. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567. See, in particular, Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention, which states that “should any doubt arise as to whether 
persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands 
of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as 
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.” Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 208. Patrick McGeehan, Bush Honors Veterans at the Intrepid, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 2008, at A24 (mentioning “the absence of another terrorist attack on 
American soil since 9/11”). 
 209. See Carl Hulse, On Wave of Voter Unrest, Democrats Take Control of 
House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P2 (describing how “public dissatisfaction 
with the Iraq war” was a primary reason for Democrats taking control of the 
House).  
 210. See Paul Steinhauser, Poll: More Disapprove of Bush Than Any Other 
President, CNN NEWS, May 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/ 
01/bush.poll/. 
 211. Hulse, supra note 209, at P2.  
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registered among the lowest approval ratings in the modern 
era.212 Crucially, the threat of terrorism in the eyes of many 
had abated significantly, in part because of the lack of any at-
tacks on the U.S. homeland. Reflecting on the Court’s ruling in 
Hamdan, Robert Pushaw recognized that “the Justices usually 
defer to the military judgments of the majoritarian branches, 
often because they have no other realistic choice. If the terror-
ists escalate their attacks and the President responds aggres-
sively, history suggests that the Court will back down.”213 Had 
the United States suffered another catastrophic attack between 
the summers of 2006 and 2008, it seems plausible that the Su-
preme Court would have rendered a different decision.  
Boumediene itself offers evidence in support of this suppo-
sition. The Court repeatedly emphasized its appreciation for 
the national security threat that the nation faced, and the im-
portance of granting the President deference as he designed 
policies to address it.214 Just as it did in Youngstown, however, 
the Court in Boumediene ruled against the President because a 
majority did not believe that the President’s policies were 
strictly necessary for the nation to prevail in war.215 Justice 
Kennedy wrote that, “although the Court is sensitive to the fi-
nancial and administrative costs of holding the Suspension 
Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad, these 
factors are not dispositive because the Government presents no 
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo 
would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction.”216 The 
Court thus implies that if credible evidence did exist, then con-
cerns about the “financial and administrative costs” of a ruling 
against the President would not merely be salient, they would 
prove dispositive. 
 
 212. Steinhauser, supra note 210. 
 213. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The ‘Enemy Combatant’ Cases in Historical 
Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1005, 1078 (2007).  
 214. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) (“The law 
must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain 
those who pose a real danger to our security.”). 
 215. Id. at 2237. 
 216. Id. Later in the opinion, Kennedy again noted that, “[t]he Government 
presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo 
would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the de-
tainees’ claims. And in light of the plenary control the United States asserts 
over [Guantanamo Bay], none are apparent to us.” Id. at 2261. 
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As it did in both Milligan and Youngstown, the Boume-
diene Court couched its opinion in language that appeared, at 
least superficially, to reject crisis jurisprudence. Kennedy arti-
culated the position most forcefully, insisting that, “[t]he laws 
and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, 
in extraordinary times.”217 But notice the language here. Jus-
tice Kennedy did not write that the laws and Constitution must 
bind the President in war just as tightly as they do in peace—
rather, they must merely “survive” and “remain in force.”218 
And throughout the majority opinion, Kennedy identified ma-
terial wartime conditions under which the Court might uphold 
presidential policies.  
The Court, for instance, raised a variety of concerns about 
the type of war that preoccupied the nation. In particular, the 
majority expressed skepticism that crisis jurisprudence re-
quires the Court to defer to the President in a war that lacks 
clear frontlines, enemies, and timetables.219 And just as Tru-
man’s failure to secure a formal congressional authorization for 
waging the Korean War influenced the majority in Youngstown, 
so did Bush’s failure to formally declare war for the majority in 
Boumediene. Kennedy emphasized that past practices of judi-
cial deference during declared wars did not establish precedent 
for the current military campaign.220 Though “common-law 
courts abstained altogether from matters involving prisoners of 
war, there was greater justification for doing so in the context 
of declared wars with other nation states. Judicial intervention 
might have complicated the military’s ability to negotiate ex-
change of prisoners with the enemy . . . .”221 Deference, the 
Court explicitly recognized, is often justified during times of 
war. But consistent with the dictates of crisis jurisprudence, 
the Justices themselves must evaluate whether the exigencies 
of a particular war require deference to a particular policy that, 
all concede, would not withstand judicial scrutiny during peace. 
Harkening back to Milligan, the Boumediene Court again 
noted that the military tribunals, over which the government 
retained complete control, were physically located far from the 
 
 217. Id. at 2277. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 2262 (discussing the immeasurable duration of conflict and 
territorial limits of the war). 
 220. Id. at 2248–49. 
 221. Id. 
HOWELL_4fmt 4/18/2009 4:56 PM 
1816 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1778 
 
 
field of battle.222 Had this been otherwise, though, deference to 
the President might have been justified. “[I]f the detention fa-
cility were located in an active theater of war,” Kennedy ex-
pressly noted, “arguments that issuing the writ would be ‘im-
practicable or anomalous’ would have more weight.”223 Then, 
later in the opinion, Kennedy admitted that: 
The real risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and 
not likely soon to abate. The ways to disrupt our life and laws are so 
many and unforeseen that the Court should not attempt even some 
general catalogue of crises that might occur. Certain principles are 
apparent, however. Practical considerations and exigent circums-
tances inform the definition and reach of the law’s writs, including 
habeas corpus.224 
Substituting “government power” for “law’s writs” yields a 
near-perfect expression of crisis jurisprudence. After all, crisis 
jurisprudence does not require the judiciary to uphold every ac-
tion taken by presidents during times of war. Rather, it asks 
judges and Justices to evaluate the context in which presidents 
take action. If courts deem the exigencies of the war at hand 
sufficiently great, and the President’s policy sufficiently impor-
tant to protecting the nation, then they are to recognize the ex-
ceptional nature of war and defer to the President, even though 
a strict reading of existing statute or the Constitution counsels 
otherwise.  
Assessments of such “practical considerations” of war con-
stitute the key point of disagreement between the five members 
of the majority and the four dissenters in Boumediene. In his 
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly cautioned the Court 
not to second-guess the elected branches, which retain more 
expertise about the conduct of war than does the judiciary.225 
And over and over again, Roberts quoted precedent in advocat-
ing that the government’s protection of individual rights be 
“‘tailored to alleviate [the] uncommon potential to burden the 
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.’”226 The gov-
 
 222. Id. at 2261–62 (noting how the facility is not “located in an active 
theater of war”). 
 223. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in the result)).  
 224. Id. at 2274–75. In his short concurrence, Justice Souter similarly 
noted that “in periods of exigency the tempo of any habeas review must reflect 
the immediate peril facing the country.” Id. at 2278, (Souter, J., concurring). 
 225. See, e.g., id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“All that today’s opi-
nion has done is shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign policy and na-
tional security decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary.”).  
 226. Id. at 2285 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)). 
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ernment’s “weighty interests” during war deserved not mere 
recognition, Roberts insisted; in this instance, they required ac-
tual deference.227 
In his own dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia appeared simply 
aghast at the majority’s unwillingness to defer to the other 
branches of government as they fought the single most impor-
tant war of the new millennium. He began his dissent with a 
long list of the offences committed by terrorists against the 
United States. “America is at war with radical Islamists,” he 
intoned, and then proceeded to count off the number of U.S. cit-
izens who died in every major terrorist attack since the 1983 
bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon.228 The Court had 
no business overturning a policy that both the President and 
Congress deemed imperative to the nation’s fight against ter-
rorism.229 Meddling in their affairs, Scalia ominously predicted, 
“will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause 
more Americans to be killed.”230  
Boumediene, it bears recognizing, does not settle the dis-
pute over existing military tribunals. Detainees at Guantana-
mo now have greater access to U.S. civilian courts, but as of 
this Article’s publication, it remains unclear what specific Due 
Process protections they will be granted. We still do not know 
whether civilian courts retain jurisdiction over only those de-
tainees held at Guantanamo Bay, or whether the courts might 
hear appeals from suspects held at other military posts around 
the globe. And, of course, we have yet to see how the newly-
elected President Barack Obama and the strengthened Demo-
cratic majorities in Congress will respond to this gauntlet laid 
down by the Supreme Court.  
One thing, though, is certain: as written, much of Boume-
diene actually affirms crisis jurisprudence. The majority recog-
nized a variety of instances when judicial deference to the Pres-
ident is due in wartime, a central tenet of crisis jurisprudence. 
The dissent, moreover, railed against the hubris demonstrated 
by a group of Justices telling the elected branches how they 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id.  
 229. See id. at 2296 (“It is . . . clear that Congress and the Executive—both 
political branches—have determined that limiting the role of civilian courts in 
adjudicating whether prisoners captured abroad are properly detained is im-
portant to success in the war . . . .”). 
 230. Id. at 2294. 
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ought to wage war. And a single vote separates the two sides on 
this dispute. 
Like the previous two cases, Boumediene also raises impor-
tant questions about the timing of Supreme Court rulings on 
presidential power. In Milligan, the Court waited until after 
the Civil War had ended before overturning a conviction se-
cured under Lincoln’s system of military tribunals. In 
Youngstown, the Court ruled against a President who was wag-
ing a very different war (both in scope and popularity) than the 
one he commenced two years earlier. And most striking, per-
haps, the Court took a pass on Bush’s military tribunals in 
Hamdan, only to overturn a statutorily authorized version of 
them two years later in Boumediene. Late in unpopular wars, 
when the nation has either grown accustomed to a perceived 
foreign threat, or the threat itself has substantially abated, 
presidents would appear most vulnerable to a setback in the 
courts. If these three cases are emblematic of larger trends, 
past and present, we can expect twenty-first century presidents 
to initiate wars without substantial judicial interference, and to 
enjoy continued deference as long as they maintain domestic 
political support. 
 
  CONCLUSION   
Milligan, Youngstown, and Boumediene affirm the Su-
preme Court’s willingness to periodically stand up to wartime 
presidents. Justices will not permit presidents to do whatever 
they please during times of war, summoning Locke or Lincoln 
to justify acts that patently violate existing statutory or consti-
tutional provisions. Those who advocate a narrow, “Business as 
Usual” reading of the President’s commander-in-chief powers 
can find language to support their claims in each of these three 
cases.  
It is important, though, not to overstate matters. For pres-
idents waging war, these cases were not total defeats. Again 
and again, the Court suggested alternative situations under 
which it would uphold the President’s wartime policies. And in 
each case, three or four dissenting Justices appeared convinced 
that the contemporary war justified the President’s actions. 
The cases, moreover, confirm the basic principles of crisis juri-
sprudence. Again, crisis jurisprudence does not dictate that po-
litical and constitutional checks on presidential powers wholly 
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dissipate during times of war. Rather, crisis jurisprudence sug-
gests that judges and Justices recognize the exceptional nature 
of war and grant special allowances to the presidents who wage 
it. In these three cases, a majority of Justices chose not to grant 
such allowances. But almost every Justice admitted that under 
different circumstances, they would. And in so doing, the Jus-
tices breathed life into crisis jurisprudence at the same moment 
that they defied a president waging war. With these rulings, 
the Court struck down, but not back.  
